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Abstract. Any nonempty, compact, semi-algebraic set in [0, 1]n is the projection of the set of mixed
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1. Introduction
In bimatrix games, the structure of the set of Nash equilibria is relatively well understood: this is a
finite union of convex polytopes (Jansen, 1981 [7]). Moreover, the possible sets of Nash equilibrium payoffs
have been characterized by Lehrer et al. (2011) [8]: a subset E of R2 is the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs
of a bimatrix game if and only if this is a finite union of rectangles with edges parallel to the axes; that is,
of the form: E = ∪1≤i≤m[ai, bi]× [ci, di], where m ∈ N and ai, bi, ci, di ∈ R, with ai ≤ bi, ci ≤ di.
For finite games with 3-players or more, the picture is much less clear. It is easily seen that the set of
Nash equilibria or of Nash equilibrium payoffs is nonempty, compact and semi-algebraic; however, which
semi-algebraic sets really arise as sets of Nash equilibria or of Nash equilibrium payoffs is not known. A
few results have been obtained. For instance, Datta (2003) [6] showed that any real algebraic variety
is isomorphic to the set of completely mixed Nash equilibria of a 3-player game, and also to the set of
completely mixed equilibria of an N -player game in which each player has two strategies. More recently,
Balkenborg and Vermeulen (2014, Theorem 6.1) [1] showed that any nonempty connected compact semi-
algebraic set is homeomorphic to a connected component of the set of Nash equilibria of a finite game
in which each player has only two strategies, all players have the same payoffs, and pure strategy payoffs
are either 0 or 1. These results show that, modulo isomorphisms or homeomorphisms, and a focus on
completely mixed equilibria or connected components of equilibria, all algebraic or nonempty compact
semi-algebraic sets may be encoded as sets of Nash equilibria. We provide another result in this direction.
Since the set of Nash equilibria of an N -player finite game is a nonempty compact semi-algebraic subset
of some Rk, it follows from Tarski-Seidenberg’s theorem that the projection of such a set on a subspace Rn,
n < k, satisfies the same properties. We prove a kind of converse of this fact: for any nonempty compact
semi-algebraic set E, there exists a finite game with N > n players, each having only two pure strategies,
such that E is precisely the projection of the set of Nash equilibria of this game on its first n coordinates
(those of the first n players). In this statement, we see a mixed strategy of an N -player game with two
strategies per player as a vector (x1, ..., xN ) in [0, 1]
N ; that is, we identify the strategy of the ith player
with the probability xi that it assigns to the first of its two strategies.
The above result implies a similar result on equilibrium payoffs, as opposed to equilibria: for any
nonempty compact semi-algebraic set E in Rn, there exists a finite game with N > n players, each having
only two pure strategies, such that E is precisely the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the first n players;
that is, the projection of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs on its first n coordinates (as will become clear,
the “first n players” in our result on equilibrium payoffs have payoffs given by affine transformations of the
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strategies of the “first n players” in our result on equilibria). As discussed further in the next section, the
result on equilibria has been obtained independently by Yehuda John Levy [9], who also obtained more
general results on semi-algebraic functions and correspondences, but our techniques and precise results are
different.
Some differences with Datta (2003) [6] and Balkenborg and Vermeulen (2014) [1] should be stressed.
First, in our result, there is no isomorphism or homeomorphism involved, but a projection on the first n
players. Second, our results do not concern the set of completely mixed Nash equilibria, or a connected
component of equilibria, but the whole set of equilibria. These are not related to algebraic varieties
or to connected semi-algebraic sets, but to (nonempty compact) semi-algebraic sets, which need not be
connected. Also note that there is a fundamental difference between the set of completely mixed Nash
equilibria and the set of Nash equilibria: the first may be empty while the second cannot. This represents
a conceptual difficulty: any construction needs to check at some point the nonemptiness of the input
set. Third, our proofs are fully elementary. To be more precise, given a set and certificates of semi-
algebraicity, closedness and nonemptiness, our construction does not use any results from real algebraic
geometry. Starting with a game with n players with two strategies each and choosing their first strategies
with probabilities x1, ..., xn, we show how to add additional players with two strategies such that in
equilibrium, these additional players choose their first strategies with probabilities that are powers of the
xi, and how yet additional players then allow to build and combine any polynomial in x1,..., xn in order
to obtain that the set of equilibrium strategies of the initial n players is a given (nonempty compact)
semi-algebraic set in [0, 1]n. A small modification of the game then allows to obtain a given (nonempty
compact) semi-algebraic set in Rn as the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of n players of this game. Note
that, by contrast with the work of Yehuda John Levy, we provide a bound on the number of additional
players in our construction, which is not far from being tight. Once again, this bound is obtained only
by elementary arguments. Finally, when the semi-algebraic set is defined by polynomials with integer
coefficients, we prove a more precise result ensuring that the constructed game has integer pure payoffs,
at the cost of additional players. Once again the construction (given certificates) is elementary, but the
bound on the number of players and on the size of the integer payoffs depends on precise results of algebraic
geometry.
Note that if additional players are not restricted to have only two actions, Yehuda John Levy proved
that only three such additional players are needed [9].
The remainder of this note is organized as follows: we introduce some definitions and prove our main
results in Section 2. Section 3 compares our work to that of Yehuda John Levy. Extensions are discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Definition and main results
A subset of Rn is semi-algebraic if it may be obtained by finitely many unions and intersections of
sets defined by a polynomial equality or strict inequality. By the finiteness theorem (see for example
Proposition 5.1 in [3]), a closed semi-algebraic subset of Rn may also be described by finitely many unions
and intersections of sets defined by a polynomial weak inequality. In particular, a compact subset E of Rn
is semi-algebraic if and only if there exist positive integers A and B and polynomials in n variables Pab,
1 ≤ a ≤ A, 1 ≤ b ≤ B such that:
(1) E =
A⋃
a=1
B⋂
b=1
{x ∈ Rn, Pab(x) ≤ 0}
Let us say that a game is binary if each player has only two pure strategies. Note that our notion of binary
games is weaker than the notion used by Balkenborg and Vermeulen (2014) [1]: they define a game to be
binary if each player has two pure strategies, and if in addition, this is a common interest game (all players
have the same payoff), with pure strategy payoffs always equal to 0 or 1.
Our first result is on equilibria. As before, we identify in its statement the mixed strategy of the ith
player with the probability xi that it assigns to the first of her two pure actions.
Proposition 1. If E is a nonempty compact semi-algebraic subset of [0, 1]n, then there exists an N -player
binary game (with N > n) such that the projection of its set of Nash equilibria on its first n coordinates
(those of the first n players) is equal to E.
Our second result, a byproduct of our proof of Proposition 1, is on equilibrium payoffs.
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Proposition 2. If E is a nonempty compact semi-algebraic subset of Rn, then there exists an N -player
binary game (with N > n) such that the projection of its set of Nash equilibrium payoffs on its first n
coordinates is equal to E.
Essentially the same results have been independently obtained by Yehuda John Levy [9], but our
techniques are different. Moreover, while the results of Yehuda John Levy are stronger in that Proposition
1 appears as a corollary of a more general result on semi-algebraic functions and correspondences, our
proof is more elementary and we obtain a bound on the number of players needed: if E is described by
(1), then both in Propositions 1 and 2,
N ≤ 1 +AB + n(3 + 2 ln2(d))
where d is such that each Pab is of degree at most d in each variable.
The proof is constructive. It relies on appropriate gadget games, in the sense of algorithmic game
theory. Before introducing these gadgets, we need to clarify our notation. We only consider binary games
and we denote the two pure strategies of each player by Top and Bottom. It will be convenient to use the
same piece of notation for the name of a player and its probability to play Top except that, to be able to
distinguish between players and strategies, we use uppercase letters for players. Thus, the n basic players
of the game bear the admittedly unusual names of players X1, X2,..., Xn, and xi is the probability that
player Xi plays Top. The players we need to add are called players Xik, Yik, Sab or U . Player Xik will be
such that, in equilibrium, its probability xik of playing Top is equal to (xi)
2k . Since any positive integer
is a sum of powers of 2, products of xik allow to obtain any power (xi)
q as the value in equilibrium of a
multiaffine function of the probabilities used by the players of the game (where by multiaffine, we mean
affine in each variable). Adding and multiplying such quantities allow to obtain the quantities Pab(x),
where x = (x1, ..., xn), as the value in equilibrium of the probability that an additional player Sab plays
Top. An additional gadget game then forces an additional player U to play Top when (x1, · · · , xn) /∈ E.
Finally, the payoffs of the original players X1, ..., Xn are defined in such a way that, at any equilibrium
in which U plays Top, (x1, ..., xn) = (z1, ..., zn) where z = (z1, ..., zn) is a fixed arbitrary element of the
nonempty set E. Hence, at any equilibrium, if x /∈ E then x = z ∈ E a contradiction. The converse, that
is the fact that each x ∈ E appears in an equilibrium, is an easy byproduct of the construction.
We define our binary games by giving the payoff of each player when she chooses Top or Bottom, as a
function of the mixed strategy profiles of her opponents (more precisely, of their probabilities to play Top).
These expressions will always be multiaffine in the probabilities of playing Top of the opponents (that is
affine with respect to the probability to play Top of each opponent), ensuring that they correspond to
payoffs in the mixed extension of a binary game. For instance, our first gadget game will have (at least)
two players, say Xα and Xβ , playing Top with probability xα and xβ respectively, and with payoffs if they
play Top or Bottom described by the following tables:
(2) Player Xα
T x
B xβ
Player Xβ
T xα
B x
where x is a real number in [0, 1]. This means that the payoffs of players Xα and Xβ are respectively
xαx+ (1− xα)xβ and xβxα + (1− xβ)x. Letting Player Xα be the row player and Player Xβ the column
player, the corresponding payoff matrix would be
T B
T
B
(
x, 1 x, x
1, 0 0, x
)
independently of any other player’s action.
Lemma 3. Let x ∈ [0, 1]. In any game with 2 players whose payoffs are given by (2), and an arbitrary
number of other players with unspecified payoffs, we have: in any equilibrium, xα = x.
Proof. Assume xα > x. Then Player Xβ plays Top, hence xβ = 1. So xβ > x, thus Player Xα plays
Bottom and xα = 0. Since x ∈ [0, 1], this contradicts xα > x. Similarly if xα < x, then xβ = 0 hence
xα = 1, a contradiction. 
Lemma 4. Let i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Consider a game with n basic players X1,...,Xn, and (at least) 2q additional
players Xik, Yik, 0 ≤ k ≤ q−1, whose payoffs are given by the following tables (where, as in all subsequent
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payoff tables, T and B correspond to the actions of the player whose payoff is given in the table).
(3) Player Xik
T xi
∏k−1
j=0 xij
B yik
Player Yik
T xik
B xi
∏k−1
j=0 xij
In any equilibrium, for any k in {0, ..., q − 1}, xik = (xi)2k .
Proof. The proof is by induction on q. The case q = 1 is Lemma 3 applied to players Xi0 and Yi0 with
xα = xi0, xβ = yi0, and x = xi. Assume the result is true when adding 2(q − 1) players. To show
that the result is still true when adding 2q players, it suffices to show that we then have in equilibrium
xi(q−1) = (xi)
2q−1 . But letting k = q − 1, the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3 applied to players Xik
and Yik with xα = xik, xβ = yik and x = xi
∏k−1
j=0 xij show that in any equilibrium
xik = xi
k−1∏
j=0
xij = xi
k−1∏
j=0
(xi)
2j = (xi)
2k
as required. 
The following basic lemma transforms a polynomial in x1,..., xn into a multiaffine map in the (xi)
2k ,
i = 1 to n, k = 0 to q − 1. Due to the previous lemma, this will allow us, for any polynomial Pab, to add
a player whose payoff at equilibrium when playing Top is equal to Pab(x1, ..., xn).
Lemma 5. Let P be a polynomial in the variables x1, · · · , xn, with degree strictly less than 2q in each
variable. Then there exists a multiaffine map f : Rnq → R such that for every (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Rn
P (x1, · · · , xn) = f(x2
0
1 , ..., x
2q−1
1 , ..., x
20
n , ..., x
2q−1
n ).
Proof. Recall that any positive integer m may be written as a sum of powers of 2 (this is the binary
development of m). Thus if m < 2q, there exist numbers ε0(m),..., εq(m) in {0, 1} such that m =∑q
k=0 εk(m)2
k hence
xmi =
q−1∏
k=0
(x2
k
i )
εk(m).
Thus if we replace any xmi that appears in the polynomial P by
∏q−1
k=0(x
2k
i )
εk , and denote the resulting
expression by f(x2
0
1 , ..., x
2q−1
1 , ..., x
20
n , ..., x
q−1
n ), this defines a map f : R
nq → R such that P (x1, · · · , xn) =
f(x2
0
1 , ..., x
2q−1
1 , ..., x
20
n , ..., x
q−1
n ) for every (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Rn. Since every εk(m) is either 0 or 1 the map f
is affine in each variable. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let d < 2q. Start with a game with n basic players X1,..., Xn, and, for
each i ∈ {1, ..., n}, 2q additional players with payoffs (3). Denote xˆ = (x10, ..., x1(q−1), ..., xn0, ..., xn(q−1)).
For any polynomial Pab, define fab as in Lemma 5. Remark that by Lemmas 4 and 5, at equilibrium
Pab(x1, · · · , xn) = fab(xˆ). Since fab is multiaffine, we may add a player Sab, playing T with probability
sab, and with payoff
Player Sab
T fab(xˆ)
B 0
Add also a player U , playing Top with probability u, and with payoff
Player U
T
∏A
a=1
∑B
b=1 sab
B 0
Finally, let z = (z1, · · · , zn) be any element of E and give to the initial n players (players Xi) the payoffs
Player Xi
T (zi − xi0)u
B 0
Thus the game has (1+AB) additional players, plus 2(1+ln2(d)) for each player to construct the Xi, hence
N ≤ 1 +AB + n(3 + 2 ln2(d)).
More precisely, if d(i) is the maximal degree in xi of the polynomials Pab, then we need at most N =
1 +AB + 3n+ 2
∑
i ln2(d(i)) players.
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Let x = (x1, · · · , xn) be the n first coordinates of an equilibrium and assume x /∈ E. At equilibrium,
fab(xˆ) = Pab(x). Moreover, since x /∈ E, for each a, there is a b such that Pab(x) > 0 and thus sab = 1.
Hence
A∏
a=1
B∑
b=1
sab > 0
and u = 1 as well. Since z ∈ E, there must be an i such that xi 6= zi. Recall that in any equilibrium
xi = xi0. However, xi0 < zi implies (zi − xi0)u > 0 and xi = 1 ≥ zi, while xi0 > zi implies (zi − xi0)u < 0
and xi = 0 ≤ zi. We get a contradiction in either case.
Let now x be in E. Consider the following profile : xik = yik = (xi)
2k for all i and k, u = 0, sab = 0 if
Pab(x) ≤ 0 and 1 otherwise. All players Xik and Yik are indifferent, and players Xi as well since u = 0.
Players sab have no profitable deviations by construction. Finally, since x ∈ E, there exists a such that
for every b, sab = 0, hence
A∏
a=1
B∑
b=1
sab = 0
and Player U is indifferent.
Remark 6. Any compact semi-algebraic set E may be written as in (1), but it may be that E is naturally
described in some other way, and that putting it in form (1) is computationally expensive. Thus, it is
interesting to note that if E = ∩Aa=1 ∪Bb=1 {x ∈ Rn, Pab(x) ≤ 0}, exactly the same proof would work,
replacing the payoff of Player U by
T
∑A
a=1
∏B
b=1 sab
B 0
More generally, assume E is defined by unions and intersections (in any order) of C sets Ec =
{x, Pc(x) ≤ 0}. In this definition, replace any Ec by pc, any ∩ by a +, any ∪ by a ∗, and denote
by Q(p1, · · · , pC) the resulting expression. Then the same proof, replacing the payoff of Player U by
T Q(p1, · · · , pC)
B 0
shows that there exists an N -player game with 2 actions for each player and N ≤ 1 +C + n(3 + 2 ln2(d))
such that the projection of the set of its equilibria on the first n coordinates is precisely E.
Proof of Proposition 2 Remark that in our construction, at any equilibrium, the payoff of Player Yi0
is xi. Hence if E ∈ [0, 1]n our previous construction works (considering players Y10, ..., Yn0 as the first n
players of the game). For a general E ∈ [−D,D]n, with D > 0, apply the construction to
E′ := {x ∈ Rn | −D + 2Dx ∈ E} ⊂ [0, 1]n,
replacing the payoff of Player Yi0 by the strategically equivalent payoff:
T −D + 2Dxi0
B −D + 2Dxi
3. Comparison to results in [9]
We compare here the present paper to [9] which was written independently by Yehuda John Levy.
Briefly speaking, Proposition 1 is less general but the proof is constructive and gives an explicit bound on
the number of additional players. More precisely, Yehuda John Levy obtain three different kind of results
related to Proposition 1, that we give with increasing order of generality.
a) Our Proposition 1 is “Theorem 3.1 with binary players” in his paper. His proof is fundamentally
different from ours, relying on the triangulation of semi-algebraic sets, and does not provide bounds.
b) A slight generalization is to drop the condition that the original players are binary (but still requiring
the additional players to be): this is his Theorem 3.1. His proof relies on the previous binary case and an
additional Lemma 4.15. He also remarks that the bounds in our Proposition 1, combined with his Lemma
4.15, yield bounds in this more general case.
For the sake of completeness we point out that our explicit construction extends directly to that case,
yielding a very slightly better bound that the one obtained in [9]. Consider n finite sets Ti of cardinal ti,
a nonempty closed semi-algebraic set E in Πni=1∆(Ti), and denote by xi,j the probability that Player Xi
assigns to its jth pure action τ ij . As in the proof of Proposition 1, add binary players Xi,j,k that will play
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T with probability x2
k
i,j at equilibrium, add players Sab and U according to the definition of E, and choose
an arbitrary z in E. The payoff of player Xi is now defined as (zi,j − xi,j,0)u when playing pure action τ ij
and all the elements of the proof still hold (note that at any equilibrium in which u = 1, zi,j < xi,j = xi,j,0
would imply xi,j = 0, a contradiction). This gives a bound of 1 + AB + n + 2(1 + ln2(d))
∑
i ti for the
number of players. Actually, using
∑
j xi,j = 1, one can replace ti by ti − 1 in this formula, recovering the
bound N ≤ 1 +AB + n(3 + 2 ln2(d)) when ti = 2 for all i.
c) Levy’s Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 are far more general, dealing with representations of semi-algebraic
functions or correspondences. It does not seem that our techniques can be applied in this more general
context.
We also point out that Yehuda John Levy obtains interesting results in two other directions : when
the additional players are not restricted to be binary (Theorem 5.5), and when there are countably many
original players (Theorems 5.3 and 5.4).
4. Extensions
In the previous construction, if all Pab have coefficients in Q, the constructed game may not have all
pure profile payoffs in Q, since there is no reason one can find z ∈ E ∩ Qn. In this section we show that
it is however possible to construct such a game, at the cost of additional players. The natural idea is to
choose a z ∈ E whose coordinates zi are algebraic, with minimal polynomial Ri ∈ Q[X ], and to change
the payoff of Player Xi to
T fi(xˆ)u
B 0
where the fi are defined from the Ri as in Lemma 5 ; that is, such that fi(xˆ) = Ri(xi). There are however
two difficulties to overcome:
- firstly, if we want to give a bound on the number of additional players, we need to know the degree of
the Ri, which may be considerably larger than d. This is given by Lemma 7 below.
- secondly, it may well be that the zi have algebraic conjugates in [0, 1] that are not coordinates of
elements of E. Thus fi(xˆ) = 0 (the analog of zi = xi0) would imply Ri(xi) = Ri(zi) = 0 but not xi = zi,
hence would not lead to a contradiction. We thus need to translate those variables in intervals in which
the zi are the only zeroes of Ri. This will be done by means of additional players Vi.
We will need the two following technical lemmas to provide a precise bound on the number of additional
players. The first one in a particular case of Algorithm 14.16 in [2], while the second one is Theorem (B)
in [4]. Beware that in Lemma 7, d is the degree in each variable, while in the result we use (Algorithm
14.16 in [2]), it is the total degree.
Lemma 7. There exists a universal constant K such that, for every nonempty semi-algebraic set E =
∪Aa=1 ∩Bb=1 {x ∈ Rn, Pab(x) ≤ 0} ⊂ [0, 1]n where each Pab ∈ Z[x1, · · · , xn], is of degree at most d ≥ 2 in
each variable, and with coefficients bounded by M , there exists z ∈ E such that all coordinates zi are zeroes
of some Ri ∈ Z[X ] with degree less than (nd)Kn and coefficients less than (M + 1)(nd)Kn.
Lemma 8. Let P ∈ Z[X ] be a polynomial with no multiple roots, with degree d ≥ 2 and coefficients bounded
by M . Then the minimal distance between two roots is greater than
√
3(d+ 1)−
2d+1
2 M1−d > d−2dM−d.
We can now prove :
Proposition 9. Let d ≥ 2. There exists a universal constant K ′ such that, for every nonempty semi-
algebraic set E = ∪Aa=1 ∩Bb=1 {x ∈ Rn, Pab(x) ≤ 0} in [0, 1]n, where each Pab ∈ Z[x1, · · · , xn], is of
degree at most d in each variable, and with coefficients bounded by M , there exists a binary N -player game
with integer pure payoffs bounded by (nd(M + 1))(nd)
K′n
, and N ≤ 1 + AB +K ′n2 ln2(nd) such that the
projection of the set of its equilibria on the first n coordinates is precisely E.
Proof. Let z = (z1, · · · , zn) ∈ E such that every zi is algebraic. Let Ri ∈ Z[X ] be the minimal polynomial
of zi. By Lemma 7, we may choose z such that Ri is of degree less than d1 = (nd)
Kn and with coefficients
less than M1 = (M +1)
(nd)Kn = (M +1)d1. Define M2 = (nd(M +1))
(nd)2Kn = (nd(M +1))d
2
1 ≥ d2d11 Md11
(the inequality holds provided K ≥ 1, which we may assume without loss of generality). Since Ri is
minimal it has no multiple roots hence by Lemma 8 there exists an nonnegative integer αi < M2 such that
zi is the only zero of Ri in
[
αi
M2
, 1+αiM2
]
. Let Qi(x) =M2
d1Ri
(
x+αi
M2
)
. Then Qi has degree at most d1, and
its only zero in [0, 1] is M2zi − αi. Moreover, for any l ≤ d, the coefficient of xl is an integer and bounded
by
SEMI-ALGEBRAIC SETS AND EQUILIBRIA 7
Md12
d1∑
j=l
M1
(
j
l
)
αj−li
M j2
≤M1Md12 2d1 ≤ (2(M + 1))d1(nd(M + 1))d
3
1 ≤ (nd(M + 1))d1+d31 :=M3.
Finally, up to a change of sign, we may assume Qi(0) ≥ 0 and Qi(1) ≤ 0.
Define players Xik, Sab and U as in the proof of Proposition 1. Consider now n additional players Vi
that play Top with probability vi and with payoffs to be defined later on. Denote by D the integer part of
ln2(d1) ; for any i defines as in Lemma 4 some additional players Vik (playing a role with respect to the vi
similar to the Xik with respect to the xi) and Wik (playing a role similar to the Yik) for k = 0 to D. Thus
at equilibrium vik = (vi)
2k . For any Qi one defines some multiaffine fi as in Lemma 5. This allows us to
define the payoff of player Vi as
T ufi(vi0, · · · , viD)
B 0
Finally, define the payoff of the n original players Xi as well as yet n additional players Yi as
Player Xi
T (1− u)xi0 + uvi + αi
M2
B yi
Player Yi
T xi
B (1− u)xi0 + uvi + αi
M2
Let x = (x1, · · · , xn) be the n first coordinates of an equilibrium and assume x /∈ E. As in the
proof of Proposition 1, one has u = 1. Also, since we are at equilibrium Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that
Qi(vi) = fi(vi0, · · · , viD). Thus Qi(vi) > 0 implies vi = 1 thus Qi(vi) ≤ 0, while Qi(vi) < 0 implies vi = 0
thus Qi(vi) ≥ 0, in both cases a contradiction. Hence Qi(vi) = 0 and vi = M2zi − αi. Since u = 1,
(1 − u)xi0 + u vi+αiM2 = zi ∈ [0, 1] , so applying Lemma 3 to the payoffs of players Xi and Yi yields xi = zi
and x = z ∈ E, a contradiction.
Let now x be in E and consider the profile where vik = wik = xik = yik = (xi)
2k for all i and k,
vi = yi = xi, u = 0, and sab = 0 if Pab(x) ≤ 0 and 1 otherwise. Then all players are indifferent, except
some Sab but those have no profitable deviation by construction.
The total number of players is less than 1 + AB + n(5 + 2 ln2(d)) + 2n(1 + ln2(d1)) ≤ 1 + AB +
11Kn2 ln2(nd).
The pure payoffs of all players except Xi and Yi are integers; for players Xi and Yi this is also the case
provided one multiplies all their payoffs by M2 (which gives a strategically equivalent game). Clearly the
only players which may have a large payoff are the Vi. Their payoffs are defined as multiaffine functions
with d2 = (1 + ln2(d1)) variables in [0, 1] and coefficients smaller than M3. In the payoff there is thus an
addition of at most 2d2 terms each less than M3. The maximal payoff is thus less than
2d2M3 ≤ (nd(M + 1))d1M3 = (nd(M + 1))2d1+d
3
1 ≤ (nd(M + 1))d41 = (nd(M + 1))(nd)4Kn .

5. Remarks
5.1. Optimality of the construction. The bound we obtained in Section 2 on the number of additional
players is almost optimal in n and d. Precisely, we obtained a bound in n lnd and it is not possible to do
better than n ln dln(n ln d) . Indeed, recall the following bound on the number of connected components of a semi
algebraic set [5] :
Lemma 10. Let E be a semi-algebraic set defined by unions and intersections of s polynomial inequalities
in r variables of total degree D ≥ 2. Then its number of connected components is less than (2D−1)Dr+s−1.
Corollary 11. The set of equilibria of a binary game with N players has at most 2N7N connected com-
ponents.
Proof. The bound is trivial for N = 1 or 2 so assume N ≥ 3. Let xi be the probability that Player
i plays his first action and denote the payoff of Player i if he plays his first (resp. second) action
gi(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ) (resp. hi(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN )) where gi and hi are multiaffine. Since
for instance (
xi > 0⇒ gi(x−i) ≥ hi(x−i)
)⇔ (xi ≤ 0 or gi(x−i) ≥ hi(x−i)) ,
the set of equilibria may be written as⋂
i∈N
({xi ≥ 1} ∪ {gi(x−i) ≤ hi(x−i)}) ∩ ({xi ≤ 0} ∪ {gi(x−i) ≥ hi(x−i)}) ∩ ({xi ≥ 0} ∩ {xi ≤ 1}) .
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where we wrote, e.g., {xi ≥ 0} instead of {x ∈ Rn|xi ≥ 0}. By the previous lemma, this set has at most
(2N − 3)(N − 1)N+6N−1 < 2N7N connected components. 
Corollary 12. For every n ≥ 2 and d ≥ 2, there exists a basic semi-algebraic set described by a polynomial
inequality with n variables and degree 2d which is not the set of equilibria (or equilibrium payoffs) of the
first n players of any binary game with less than n ln d7 ln(n ln d) players.
Proof. Let (α1, · · · , αd) be d arbitrary numbers in [0, 1] and consider the set E = {x ∈ Rn, P (x1, · · · , xn) ≤
0} where P (x1, · · · , xn) :=
∑n
i=1 Π
d
j=1(xi − αj)2. E is clearly finite with cardinal dn. Assume by contra-
diction that E is the set of equilibria (or equilibrium payoffs) of the first n players of some binary game Γ
with less than N := n ln d7 ln(n ln d) players. Since taking projections or applying the payoff functions can only
decrease the number of connected components, the number of connected components of the equilibrium
set of Γ is at least dn. However, by the previous corollary, it is at most
2N7N ≤ (2N)7N =
(
2n lnd
7 ln(n ln d)
) n ln d
ln(n ln d)
< (n lnd)
n ln d
ln(n ln d) = en ln d = dn
a contradiction. The strict inequality uses that 2/7 ln(n ln d) < 1 as soon as dn > exp(e2/7) ≃ 3, 78. 
5.2. Simplicity of the construction. Our construction does not depend on Tarski-Seidenberg and real
algebraic geometry at all, and is easily seen to take a polynomial time in the data. Of course, all this
assumes that we are given certificates of semi-algebraicity and closedness (formula 1), of nonemptiness
(the coordinates of a point in E or the description of the coordinates of an algebraic point in E), as well
as a bound on E in the case of Proposition 2.
If not, it is possible to find such certificates but this uses real algebraic techniques (see for example [2])
and is typically at least exponential in the data. So, from a constructive viewpoint, we have cut the
problem in two parts :
1) Preprocessing : find certificates. This is in full generality hard and time-consuming, but for specific
examples it may be very easy and short, even if the set is itself very complex.
2) Use these certificates to construct a game. This is quite easy and not time-consuming.
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